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COMMENTS 
BLESSED ARE THE FAITHFUL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
The fourth amendment gives the people the right to be secure 
from unreasonable searches and seizures of their person, houses, 
papers, and effects. For years, the Supreme Court has mandated 
that any property seized in violation of the fourth amendment be 
excluded from evidence at the defendant's trial. Recently, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has created a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule and caused uncertainty regarding the new ex-
ception's application. The author reviews the development of the 
exclusionary rule and analyzes the effect of the good faith excep-
tion. The author also discusses the application of the exception 
to searches and seizures conducted with and without warrants, 
and considers the proper course for Maryland courts to follow. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of the good faith exception 1 is the latest in a recent 
line of Supreme Court rulings limiting the scope and applicability of the 
exclusionary rule. 2 The amorphous concept of "good faith" creates sig-
nificant uncertainty regarding the application of the exception and the 
possible extension of the exception to searches and seizures conducted 
without a warrant. 3 Expansion of the good faith exception could change 
1. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 
S. Ct. 3424 (1984). 
2. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984) (exclusionary rule not 
applicable to suppress evidence discovered during the execution of a subsequently 
issued search warrant, where there had been a prior unlawful entry and warrantless 
seizure, if the probable cause for the search warrant came from an independent 
source); Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (exclusionary rule not applicable to 
exclude physical evidence that inevitably would have been discovered); INS v. Lo-
pez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984) (exclusionary rule not applicable to deporta-
tion hearings). 
3. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the 
exclusionary rule is inapplicable to civil deportation hearings held by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service. [d. at 3490. The Lopez-Mendoza case involved an 
allegedly illegal arrest, not an illegal search warrant. In his dissent, which centered 
on his belief that the majority's conclusion was based on an incorrect assessment of 
the costs and benefits of applying the rule in deportation hearings, Justice White 
stated: 
In United States v. Leon ... we have held that the exclusionary rule is not 
applicable when officers are acting in objective good faith. Thus, if the 
agents neither know nor should have known that they were acting con-
trary to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, evidence will not be sup-
pressed even if it is held that their conduct was illegal. 
[d. at 3493 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
In a separate dissent Justice Stevens stated: "Because the Court has not yet 
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materially the protections provided by the fourth amendment. 
This comment begins by tracing the development of the exclusion-
ary rule and reviewing the purposes underlying the good faith exception.4 
Following this review, the discussion focuses on the value of the good 
faith exceptionS and examines the current scope and application of the 
exception. 6 This comment then analyzes the propriety of a possible ex-
tension of the exception to warrantless searches and seizures.7 Finally, 
Maryland's position is considered and a course for the state courts to 
follow is proposed. 8 
II. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. The Development of the Exclusionary Rule 
The seminal case in the establishment of the exclusionary rule is 
Weeks v. United States.9 There, a Federal Marshal searched the defend-
ant's room without a warrant and seized certain letters and envelopes. lO 
The materials seized were introduced into evidence over the defendant's 
objection that the evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained in 
violation of the fourth and fifth amendments. I I In reversing the trial 
court's decision to admit the evidence, the Weeks Court, relying on the 
history of the fourth amendment, reasoned that: 
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the 
United States and Federal officials, ... under limitations and 
restraints. . . . The tendency of those who execute the criminal 
laws of this country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful 
seizures and enforced confessions, . . . should find no sanction 
in the judgments of the courts .... 12' 
The Court held that when an official of the United States obtains evi-
held that the rule of United States v. Leon ... has any application to warrantless 
searches, I do not join the portion of Justice White's opinion that relies on that case. 
I do, however, agree with the remainder of his dissenting opinion." Id. at 3496 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
4. Three rationales have been cited in support of the exclusionary rule. First, it is the 
constitutionally guaranteed remedy of the accused. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). Second, it is the imperative of judicial integrity. See McNabb v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Third, it serves only to deter similar future violations of 
the fourth amendment by police. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 65 (1976). 
5. See infra notes 75-103 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 104-77 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 178-203 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 204-21 and accompanying text. 
9. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme 
Court found the seizure of an individual's private books and papers violative of the 
fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the fifth 
amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633; see 
infra note 42. 
10. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386. 
11. Id. at 388. 
12. Id. at 391-92. 
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dence in a manner that violates the constitutional mandate prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and seizures, such evidence must be excluded 
from trial. 13 
The Court's ruling evoked spirited response from legal commenta-
tors.14 Support for the Court's holding was predicated upon the proposi-
tion that the government should not violate the law or encourage future 
lawlessness by using illegally obtained evidence at trial. 15 Opponents of 
the Court's new rule reasoned that exclusion of the evidence did nothing 
to punish an official who unlawfully seized evidence but often resulted in 
the release of a guilty defendant. 16 The logic in support of the rule pre-
vailed, and the development of the exclusionary rule continued. 
B. The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to the States 
Under Weeks, the exclusionary rule applied only to actions by of-
ficers of the federal government.J7 In Wolf v. Colorado,18 the Court first 
13. Id. at 398. 
14. Justices Brandeis and Holmes both supported the rule. See infra note 15. Judge 
Cardozo and Justice Jackson, as well as evidence scholar John Henry Wigmore, 
opposed the rule. See infra note 16. 
15. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, stated: 
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds 
contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it 
promotes anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal 
law the end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may 
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal -
would bring terrible retribution. 
27 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, stated: 
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all 
evidence shall be used. It also is desirable that the Government should not 
itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which 
the evidence is to be obtained .... We have to choose, and for my part I 
think it is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Gov-
ernment should play an ignoble part. 
277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
16. Then Judge Cardozo, speaking for the majority in People v. Defore, stated: "The 
criminal is to go free because the constable blundered. . . . A room is searched 
against the law, and the body of the murdered man is found .... The privacy of the 
home has been infringed and the murderer goes free." 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 
N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926). Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority in Irvine v. Cali-
fornia, noted: "Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing 
defendant official, while it may, and likely will release the wrong-doing defendant." 
347 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1954). Professor Wigmore noted: 
Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery, Flavius, you 
have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprison-
ment for crime and Flavious for contempt. But no! We shall let you both 
go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall so by reversing 
Titus' conviction. 
8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2184 (3d ed. 1940). 
17. 232 U.S. at 398. The fourth amendment does not apply to searches and seizures by 
private citizens, United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984) (quoting 
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting», but does 
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addressed the applicability of the rule to officers of state governments. 19 
In Wolf, the Court asserted that state approval of police conduct that 
violated the fourth amendment contravened the fourteenth amend-
ment.20 Nevertheless, the Court held that, although the exclusion of evi-
dence may be an effective method of deterring illegal searches, it was not 
for the Court to condemn a state's reliance upon other methods of deter-
rence, which, if consistently enforced, would be as effective as the exclu-
sion of illegally obtained evidence at tria1.21 Consequently, the Court did 
not require state courts to adopt the exclusionary rule. 22 
Thirty-seven years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,23 the Supreme Court 
changed its position and held that the exclusionary rule was mandatory 
in state courtS.24 Justice Clark, writing the plurality opinion, reasoned 
that the exclusionary rule was applicable to the states because it was an 
essential part of both the fourth and fourteenth amendments.25 Justice 
Clark stated that the factual grounds upon which Wolf was based were 
no longer controlling26 and that "the admission of the new constitutional 
right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important 
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence .... "27 
apply to officers of all branches of the government. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 
733, 739-41 (1984); see infra note 58. 
18. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
19.Id. 
20. Id. at 31. Prior to the Wolf decision 31 states had rejected the Weeks doctrine and 
16 states had accepted it. Id. at 29-30. 
The Wolf decision led to what has been called the "silver platter" doctrine. 
Because the exclusionary rule was applicable only to federal officers and federal 
courts, and not to state officers or state courts, any evidence recovered by state 
police during illegal searches could be used against a defendant in state or federal 
courts. In addition, if federal agents conducted impermissible searches, any discov-
ered evidence could be given to state agents to be used against a defendant in state 
courts. These practices were eliminated by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 
(1960) and Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). In Elkins, the Court held 
that evidence obtained by state officers in violation of an individual's fourth amend-
ment rights was inadmissible in a federal trial. 364 U.S. at 223. The Court relied on 
the concept of judicial integrity, reasoning that the acceptance of evidence secured 
through a flagrant disregard of an individual's constitutional rights made courts 
accomplices to wrongdoing and created federal action sufficient to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule. Id. In Rea, the Court held that the exclusion of illegally seized evi-
dence was an appropriate remedy against a federal agent who planned to use his 
illegal search and seizure as the basis of his testimony in state court. 350 U.S. at 
217-18. 
21. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31-32. 
22. /d. at 33. 
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
24. Id. at 650-53. Justice Clark noted that, at the time of the Wolf decision, "[t]he 
contrariety of views of the States was ... particularly impressive." Id. at 651 (quot-
ing Wolf, 3~8 U.S. at 29); see supra note 22. However, more than half of the states 
passing on the question since Wolf had wholly or partly adhered to the Weeks doc-
trine. /d. 
25. Id. at 657. 
26. /d. at 653. 
27. /d. at 656. 
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Although the Mapp decision never has been overruled, the reasoning be-
hind its holding - that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally man-
dated remedy of the aggrieved - has been abandoned.28 
C The Purposes of the Exclusionary Rule 
Three arguments have been advanced to justify the exclusionary 
rule: (1) the rule is a constitutionally guaranteed remedy of the ag-
grieved;29 (2) the rule is necessary to maintain judicial integrity;30 and (3) 
the rule serves as a deterrent to future violations of the fourth amend-
ment by government officials.31 
1. The exclusion of evidence is not a constitutionally guaranteed 
remedy 
The constitutional remedy argument has its ongms in Boyd v. 
United States. 32 The Boyd Court held that to require someone to pro-
duce his private papers to be used against him in evidence is analogous to 
compelling someone to testify against himself and, thus, constitutes an 
unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment. 33 In 
Weeks, the Court noted: "If letters and private documents can thus be 
28. E.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984) (fourth amendment con-
tains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of 
its commands); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (exclusion of evidence 
does not cure the invasion of the defendant's fourth amendment rights); United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (use of the fruits of past unlawful 
search or seizure works no new fourth amendment wrong). 
29. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430-31 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-
92 (1914). 
30. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960); McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332, 345 (1943); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
31. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 348 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
32. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) see C. Moylan, The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment and 
the Exclusionary Rule, The Daily Record, July 12, 1984 at 1, col. 4. 
33. [d. at 621-30. Justice Bradley, writing for the majority in Boyd, conducted an in-
depth historical analysis of the developments of the fourth and fifth amendments, 
tracing the protected rights back to Lord Camden's interpretation of the British 
Constitution in 1765. 116 U.S. at 621-33. Justice Bradley concluded that the two 
amendments "throw great light on each other." "The unreasonable searches and 
seizures condemned by the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the 
purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself which is condemned 
by the fifth amendment." [d. at 633. 
The rationale of Boyd was eroded severely by the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904), which held that the use of an indi-
vidual's papers found in a legal search is not compelled self-incrimination. See also 
Doe v. United States, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (grand jury subpoena of business records 
is not compelled self-incrimination); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-77 
(1976) (use of defendant's business records, seized pursuant to office search did not 
offend fifth amendment); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-401 (1976) (a 
summons requiring the production of a taxpayer's records did not violate the fifth 
amendment proscription against compelled self-incrimination). 
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seized and held and used in evidence, ... the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and 
seizures is of no value, and, ... might as well be stricken from the Consti-
tution."34 The Weeks Court stated that failure to return items taken 
from the defendant's house pursuant to an illegal search constituted "a 
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused."35 
The Wolf decision was the first to distinguish between the constitu-
tional protection afforded the individual by the fourth amendment and 
the use of the exclusionary rule as a nonconstitutionally required device 
for deterring violations.36 The Wolf Court recognized that the fourth 
amendment is enforceable against the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 37 That Court then refused to apply 
the exclusionary rule to the states, however, reasoning that the methods 
of protecting a defendant's fourth amendment right should be left to the 
discretion of the states.38 The Court noted that the Weeks rule barring 
evidence secured through an illegal search "was not derived from the 
explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment. . .. The decision was a 
matter of judicial implication."39 
In the later Mapp decision, the Court held that the exclusionary rule 
is an essential part of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.40 Justice 
Black, concurring in Mapp, recognized that although the rule is not 
required by the express language of the Constitution, the rule "is amply 
justified from an historical standpoint [and] soundly based in 
reason .... "41 
Decisions since Mapp have reverted to the Wolf analysis that the 
exclusionary rule is a nonconstitutionally required device for deterring 
fourth amendment violations. In holding that Mapp should not be ap-
plied retrospectively, Justice Clark, writing for the majority of the Court 
in Linkletter v. Walker,42 stated that Mapp's primary purpose was to pro-
vide for enforcement of fourth amendment guarantees through the use of 
the exclusionary rule.43 Justice Clark further stated that although the 
exclusion of illegally seized evidence was the only effective deterrent to 
lawless police action, this deterrent purpose would not be advanced by 
applying the rule retrospectively.44 Thus, the Linkletter decision aban-
34. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393. 
35. Id. at 398. 
36. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
37. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28. 
38. Id. at 28. 
39.Id. 
40. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. The Court noted that "our holding that the exclusionary 
rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only 
the logical dictate of prior cases, but it also makes very good sense." Id. 
41. Id. at 662 (Black, J., concurring). 
42. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
43. Id. at 636. 
44. Id. at 636-37. The Linkletter interpretation of Mapp would be less persuasive had 
Justice Clark not written both opinions. Because Justice Clark did write both opin-
502 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
doned the constitutional remedy argument and became the first of many 
cases to rely on the deterrent theory.45 
United States v. Calandra 46 was the first case to state explicitly that 
the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right of the aggrieved. Quot-
ing Linkletter, the Court stated that the purpose of the rule is not to 
redress an injury to the privacy of the aggrieved: "[T]he ruptured pri-
vacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation 
comes too late. "47 Instead, the Court found the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary rule to be deterrence of future conduct that violates the 
fourth amendment. 48 The Court held that the rule does not apply to 
exclude illegally seized evidence from grand jury hearings, because the 
damage to such proceedings created by the exclusion of evidence greatly 
outweighs any possible incremental deterrent effect.49 
The constitutionally guaranteed remedy theory was short-lived. It 
served its purpose in Mapp, when the Court needed a rationale to support 
the logical extension of the exclusionary rule to the states, but was aban-
doned because strict adherence to it would require exclusion of evidence 
in cases where exclusion would have little or no deterrent effect. 50 
2. The rule is not the imperative of judicial integrity 
A second argument for applying the exclusionary rule is that it is 
the imperative of judicial integrity. This argument dates back to the 
original reasoning in support of the exclusionary rule. 51 The rationale 
behind this idea is that, by accepting evidence acquired through illegal 
means, courts become accomplices in the illegal police activity and en-
courage the continuation of illegal evidence-gathering techniques. 
This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court in McNabb v. 
ions, it seems likely that the Linkletter decision is merely an interpretation of Mapp, 
not a departure from it. 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413-16 (1984) (to exclude evidence 
seized in objective good faith pursuant to a technically invalid search warrant does 
not serve a deterrent purpose); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-94 (1976) (raising 
search and seizure claims in federal habeas corpus review would not serve a deter-
rent purpose); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-60 (1976) (exclusion ofille-
gaIly seized evidence from civil trials would not serve a deterrent purpose); United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974) (extending exclusionary rule to 
grand jury proceedings would achieve only a speculative deterrent effect at the ex-
pense of substantially impeding the grand jury's role). 
46. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
47. /d. at 347 (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637). 
48. /d. 
49. [d. at 354. Similarly, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court held that 
the exclusionary rule was not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. [d. at 494. 
Citing Linkletter and Calandra, the opinion stated that "[p]ost-Mapp decisions have 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right." [d. at 486. 
50. See infra notes 68, 77. 
51. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court stated: "The effect of the 
Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials 
... under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of [their] authority." [d. at 
392; see supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
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United States,52 where the Court held that "a conviction resting on evi-
dence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which 
Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making 
the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of the law."53 
In Elkins v. United States,54 the Court relied on the language of Mc-
Nabb and held that federal courts could not accept evidence obtained 
illegally by state officers. 55 The Court held that "evidence obtained by 
state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, 
would have violated the defendant's [fourth amendment rights] is inad-
missible over a defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial. "56 
Because the exclusionary rule was not then applicable to the states, the 
Court used the judicial integrity reasoning to support its holding in 
ElkinsY 
When the judicial integrity argument is extended to its logical con-
clusion, the weakness of the argument is revealed. If courts are pre-
cluded from accepting any evidence seized illegally, courts would not be 
able to accept evidence obtained illegally by private persons, although 
not in violation of the fourth amendment. This extension, however, has 
never been adopted by the Court. The Court has limited the exclusion-
ary rule to governmental conduct in violation of the fourth 
amendment. 58 
The judicial integrity argument, like the constitutionally guaranteed 
remedy argument, was used by the Court to solve the practical problem 
presented by the facts in Elkins, but discarded when it became a barrier 
to other policy decisions. 59 In Stone v. Powell,6O the Court stated that 
52. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). In McNabb, federal agents questioned prisoners accused of 
killing a federal revenue agent in violation of a Congressional command making it 
the duty of all federal agents to take prisoners to a judicial officer before questioning. 
[d. at 342. McNabb's judicial integrity language, although not involving a Constitu-
tional violation, became the basis for applying the judicial integrity argument to 
fourth amendment violations. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
53. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345. 
54. 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see supra note 20. 
55. /d. at 223; see supra note 20. 
56. /d. 
57. Because the Elkins decision was before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the 
exclusionary rule was not yet applicable to the fruits of unconstitutional searches 
made by state officers. 
58. The fourth amendment applies only to actions by the government, "it is wholly 
inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private 
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or 
knowledge of any government officiaL'" United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 
1656 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting». The fourth amendment does apply, however, to civil as well as 
criminal authorities of the government. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 740 
(1984) (school teachers); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) 
(building inspectors); Marshall v. Bailow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978) (Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration inspectors); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 
499, 506 (1978) (firefighters). 
59. See infra note 61. 
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"although our decisions often have alluded to the 'imperative of judicial 
integrity' ... this concern has limited force as a justification for the ex-
clusion of highly probative evidence."61 
3. The purpose of the rule is to deter illegal police conduct 
The only surviving purpose for the existence of the exclusionary rule 
is to deter future fourth amendment violations. This purpose has been 
cited frequently, even by those decisions that also had advanced the con-
stitutionally guaranteed remedy or judicial integrity arguments.62 Under 
the deterrence argument, evidence illegally obtained is excluded only if 
exclusion will deter future police violations of fourth amendment 
rights.63 The Court regularly has refused to apply the exclusionary rule 
when it would not serve as a deterrent to such conduct.64 The Court's 
60. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
61. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 485. 
Justice Powell cited numerous situations where the judicial integrity theory, if 
logically extended, would require different results. Id. It would require abandon-
ment of the standing requirement to argue exclusion. But see United States v. 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733-37 (1980) (supervisory power of the federal courts does 
not authorize suppression of otherwise admissible evidence on the grounds that it 
was seized illegally from a third party not before the court); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128, 133-38 (1978) (a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only 
through the introduction of evidence procured through an illegal search of a third 
person's premises has not had his fourth amendment rights infringed). It would 
require exclusion of evidence for impeachment purposes. But see United States v. 
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624-28 (1980) (a defendant's statements made in response to 
proper cross-examination, reasonably suggested by defendant's direct examination, 
are subject to impeachment by the use of illegally obtained evidence); Walden v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 62, 62-66 (1954) (illegally seized evidence admissible for the 
limited purpose of impeaching defendant's credibility, once the door is opened by 
defendant's own statements). It would require that judicial proceedings abate when 
the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized. But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (illegal arrest does not void a subsequent conviction); Frisbie v. 
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (power of a court to try a person for crime is not 
impaired by the fact that he was brought into the court's jurisdiction by force). It 
would require exclusion of evidence from grand jury proceedings. But see United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353-55 (1974) (grand jury questions based on evi-
dence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure involve no new fourth amend-
ment wrong). Finally, it would require exclusion of evidence despite the defendant's 
lack of objection. But see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1965) (failure 
to object to a Constitutional breach of rights effects a waiver thereof). 
62. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court noted: "Only last year the Court 
itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter - to compel 
respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only available way - by removing 
the incentive to disregard it.''' Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 217 (1960). For a discussion of Mapp's constitutionally guaranteed remedy 
theory, see supra notes 47, 48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Elkins' 
judicial integrity theory, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
63. E.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965). 
64. The exclusionary rule has not been applied to evidence discovered during the execu-
tion of a subsequently issued search warrant where there had been a prior unlawful 
entry and warrantless seizure if the probable cause for the search warrant came 
from an independent source. Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984). Nor 
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adoption of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule65 follows 
from the Court's acceptance of the deterrence rationale. Unfortunately, 
the good faith exception is stated in broad terms and is open to misappli-
cation by lower courtS.66 
III. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO SEARCHES 
PURSUANT TO A WARRANT 
In United States v. Leon,67 the Supreme Court established an excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule. In August, 1981, a confidential informant 
of unproven reliability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Depart-
ment that two persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy" were 
selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their residence 
in Burbank. 68 The Burbank police then conducted an investigation that 
resulted in several observations supporting the informant's story.69 
Based on the information supplied by the informant and the information 
compiled during the investigation, a facially valid search warrant was 
issued in September, 1981, by a state superior courtjudgeJo The United 
States District Court for the Central District of California suppressed 
some of the evidence because the warrant was insufficient to establish 
has it been applied at a deportation hearing, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 
(1984), to exclude physical evidence that would have been inevitably discovered, 
Nix v. Williams, lO4 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), to impeachment situations, United States v. 
Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), to situa-
tions where police enforce a law later declared to be unconstitutional, Michigan v. 
Defillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), to the use of a live witness discovered by an unconsti-
tutional search, United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), to federal habeas corpus review, Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 (1976), to civil proceedings, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), to 
grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), or retroac-
tively, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
65. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
66. See infra notes 128-36, 158-66, 188-92 and accompanying text. 
67. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
68. Id. at 3409-lO. The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale ofmetha-
qual one by "Patsy" at the residence approximately five months earlier and observed 
at that time a shoebox containing a large amount of cash that belonged to "Patsy." 
He also said the "Armando" and "Patsy" kept only small quantities of drugs at 
their residence and stored the remainder at another location in Burbank. Id. at 
34lO. 
69. Id. The Burbank police investigated the residence described by the informant. Cars 
parked at the residence were determined to belong to Armando Sanchez and Patsy 
Stewart. The police also observed a man convicted of possession of marijuana in 
large quantitites enter the house and exit shortly with a small paper sack. An inves-
tigation of that man led police to Alberto Lear, who had been arrested on drug 
charges in 1980, and whom police had an independent basis for believing had a large 
quantity of methaqualone at his residence and was heavily involved in the importa-
tion of drugs. The police also observed several persons, at least one of whom had 
prior drug involvements, arriving at the residence and leaving with small packages. 
Id. 
70. The ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs from several residences and 
in cars belonging to those accused. Id. 
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probable cause71 and a divided panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.72 Both courts refused the govern-
ment's invitation to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. 73 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence will not be 
excluded in situations where a police officer acts in good faith, in both the 
application for, and the execution of, a subsequently invalidated search 
warrant. 74 
A. Is the Good Faith Exception Sound? 
The basis of the good faith exception rests in the acceptance of de-
terrence of police misconduct as the purpose of the exclusionary rule. In 
Leon,75 the Court reaffirmed the proposition that deterrence is the reason 
for invoking the exclusionary rule.76 The Court also reaffirmed that the 
deterrent effect of the rule must be weighed against the high cost of ex-
cluding evidence and losing convictions.77 The Leon Court determined 
that the deterrent effect of excluding evidence is minimal and greatly out-
weighed by the high cost of excluding relevant evidence where an officer 
relied, in good faith, upon the decision of a magistrate.78 
The problem with the Court's cost/benefit analysis is that there is 
very little empirical data showing that either the "costs" are too high or 
the "benefits" are too low.79 According to Justice Brennan, the majority 
has created "an illusion of technical precision and ineluctability," 
notwithstanding that no empirical method of evaluating the costs and 
benefits of the exclusionary rule has been devised. 80 
Absent any hard data, the cost/benefit analysis can be conducted 
only by weighing what the Supreme Court Justices believe to be the costs 
and benefits associated with the exclusion of evidence. Justice White, 
speaking for the majority in Leon, stated that it is unreasonable to expect 
a police officer to question the decision of a magistrate once the magis-
trate assures the officer that a warrant complies with the fourth amend-
ment. Exclusion of evidence in such a situation, therefore, would serve 
71. [d. at 3411 n.2. 
72. The warrant was invalidated by the two lower courts using the two-pronged test 
established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 
393 U.S. 410 (1969). That test was abandoned by the Supreme Court in favor of a 
less technical "totality of the circumstances" test in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983). For a brief discussion of Gates, see infra notes 139-51 and accompanying 
text. 
73. Leon,l04 S. Ct. at 3411. In response to a request of the government, the district 
court made it clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith. [d. 
74. [d. at 3420-21. 
75. /d. 
76. /d. at 3412. 
77. [d. at 3412-13. 
78. [d. at 3419. 
79. See id. at 3413 n.6; id. at 3437 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
80. [d. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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no deterrent purpose.8! 
The majority's reasoning is grounded on the premise that only the 
police, not issuing magistrates, are to be deterred by the exclusionary 
rule. 82 The majority found that this premise does not offend the idea that 
the deterrent effect is "systemic."83 "The justification for the exclusion 
of evidence obtained by improper methods is to motivate the law enforce-
ment profession as a whole - not the aberrant individual officer - to 
adopt and enforce regular procedures that will avoid the future invasion 
of the citizen's constitutional rights."84 
Justice White explained that systemic deterrence is not offended by 
the good faith exception because "[j]udges and magistrates are not ad-
juncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have 
no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat 
of exclusion cannot be expected significantly to deter them."85 
Justice White also suggested that professional incentives, such as 
professional ethics or fear of removal, will deter judicial officers from 
issuing improper warrants. 86 This logic is faulty, however, because not 
all magistrates are required to be judges or even lawyers.87 Moreover, all 
magistrates bring with them whatever ideas they have regarding law and 
order, inevitably resulting in different results from different magistrates, 
absent some deterrent guidelines. 
In Shadwick v. City of Tampa,88 the Court held that a municipal 
clerk, who was neither a lawyer nor a judge, could issue warrants legiti-
mately for nonfelonies.89 Magistrates who are not lawyers or judges are 
not subject to the same professional incentives that Justice White sug-
gested. Moreover, the lay magistrate will not have the benefit of a legal 
education and is thus more likely to have, and be affected by, personal 
ideas about law and order. It is unrealistic and naive to suggest that each 
8l. Id. at 3420. 
82. The cornerstone of the Leon decision is that it is the police, not the magistrate, who 
are to be deterred by the exclusion of evidence. Id. at 3418 n.15. Justice White 
dismissed the idea that the rule had any deterrent effect on magistrates or others 
who issue search warrants. [d. at 3418 n.17. 
83. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: 
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 399-401 (1981). 
84. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 221 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
85. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418. Justice White's reasoning seems to be based on the "neu-
tral and detached" requirement established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the Supreme Court held that probable cause determi-
nations and the issuance of a search warrant must be made by a "neutral and de-
tached magistrate." The Court there invalidated a warrant issued by an attorney 
general. [d. at 449-53. 
86. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418-19 n.18. Justice White stated that federal magistrates, for 
example, are subject to supervision of the district courts. "They may be removed 
for 'incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability.' " 
[d. at 3419 n.18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 631(i». 
87. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (search warrant issued by munici-
pal clerk upheld so long as neutral and detached). 
88.Id. 
89. Id. at 352. 
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magistrate, even those subject to scrutiny under federal law, does not 
have his own ideas about criminal law enforcement that influence his 
daily decisions. No one would assert that Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Brennan have the same philosophy about the proper balance between 
criminal law enforcement and the rights of the citizen; their differing phi-
losophies are obvious from their respective judicial opinions. It is unrea-
sonable to suggest that magistrates are any different. If the deterrent 
effect were extended to issuing magistrates, inconsistent decisions on the 
same set of facts by different magistrates would be less likely to occur. 
Another reason used to support the good faith exception is that po-
lice officers should be rewarded for following procedures that have been 
authorized by either the judiciary or the legislature. It has been argued 
that when a police officer has complied with the relevant legal rules for 
searches and seizures but the evidence he gathers still is excluded from 
trial, the officer easily becomes contemptuous of the warrant requirement 
and is encouraged to resort to warrantless searches, with the hope that 
some exception to the warrant requirement might develop at the time of 
the search. 90 
The idea that police should be rewarded for following presumptively 
correct procedures has its origins in Michigan v. Defillippo.9) There the 
Court held that where a police officer has made an arrest pursuant to a 
substantive criminal statute subsequently declared unconstitutional, the 
fruits of a search incident to that arrest should not be suppressed.92 The 
Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would encourage police officers to 
speculate concerning the constitutionality of every law they sought to 
enforce.93 "Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon 
themselves to determine which laws are and which laws are not constitu-
tionally entitled to enforcement."94 
Thus, in the context of either an existing presumptively valid statute 
or a presumptively valid warrant, it is unreasonable and illogical to ex-
pect a police officer to question the authority that he is dutifully follow-
ing. To do so would make a policeman's job impossible. Ifhe questioned 
the authority he would be guilty of derelection of duty, if he did not 
90. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). The Court noted: 
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of 
scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to 
warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some other 
exception to the Warrant Clause that might develop at the time of search. 
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or 
search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police con-
duct, by assuring 'the individual whose property is searched or seized of 
the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the 
limits of his power to search." 
Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). 
91. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). 
92. /d. at 37-38. 
93. Id. at 38. 
94.Id. 
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question the authority the evidence would be suppressed.95 
In sum, the weakest point in the argument for the good faith excep-
tion is its failure to recognize the deterrent effect the exclusionary rule 
would have on a magistrate to prevent him from issuing invalid warrants. 
This weakness is outweighed, however, by the necessity of encouraging 
police officers to adhere to the warrant requirement of the fourth amend-
ment by submitting their factual basis for probable cause to a neutral and 
detached magistrate before invading an area protected by the fourth 
amendment. 
B. Opposition to the Good Faith Exception 
Those who oppose the good faith exception argue that deterrence is 
not the primary purpose or goal of the exclusionary rule. In his dissent 
in Leon, Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, clung to 
the argument that the exclusionary rule is an integral part of the fourth 
amendment.96 Justice Brennan stated that "[a] proper understanding of 
the broad purposes sought to be served by the Fourth Amendment dem-
onstrates that the principles embodied in the exclusionary rule rest upon 
a far firmer constitutional foundation than the shifting sands of the 
Court's deterrence rationale."97 Unfortunately, in relying on the consti-
tutional remedy theory, Justice Brennan is "refighting old battles that 
have long since been lost. "98 
Another argument against the exception is the similarly moribund 
proposition that the rule is the imperative of judicial integrity. The 
Court often has stated that when more important issues present them-
selves, judicial integrity must give ground.99 Like the constitutional rem-
edy theory, the judicial integrity theory is unpersuasive. 
Another argument in opposition to the good faith exception is that it 
promotes magistrate shopping and inconsistent results. Because the 
magistrate's decision is not subject to judicial review, magistrates are free 
to issue warrants in accordance with their own SUbjective standards. 
Thus the different personal beliefs of magistrates will result in different 
decisions on the same set of facts. An officer who knows that magistrate 
A is more likely to issue a warrant than magistrate B, will seek a warrant 
from magistrate A. Justice White dismissed this practical problem as 
"speculative" and concluded that suppression of evidence should be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. 100 This implies that if magistrate shopping 
95. [d. at 38. 
96. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
97. [d. at 3431. 
98. C. Moylan, The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment and The Exclusionary Rule, 
The Daily Record, July 12, 1984 at 4, col. 5; see supra text accompanying notes 32-
SO. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61. 
100. [d. at 3419. 
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can be proved in a particular case, a reviewing court will be correct in 
finding bad faith. 
Finally, one theoretical argument against the good faith exception is 
that a reviewing court operating under the exception will never reach any 
novel fourth amendment claims, because the only question to be an-
swered by an appellate court is whether there was objective good faith on 
the part of the police officer. 101 Justice White countered this argument 
by saying that "[t]here is no need for courts to adopt the inflexible prac-
tice of always deciding whether the officers' conduct manifested objective 
good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amend-
ment has been violated."102 If the reviewing court believed that no im-
portant fourth amendment questions were at issue, the court simply 
could decide the case by turning immediately to the consideration of the 
officer's good faith.103 This seems to give the reviewing court the choice 
of whether or not to address a fourth amendment claim, which is exactly 
what critics fear. Justice White should have set up a two-step approach, 
in order to assure that the fourth amendment claims be addressed before 
turning to the question of the officer's good faith. 
C The Scope and Application of the Good Faith Exception 
1. The Good Faith Exception is Limited to Warrants 
Although some of the reasoning relied upon by the Leon Court in 
accepting the good faith exception also has been cited in support of ex-
tending the exception to warrantless searches,I04 the Supreme Court in 
Leon and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard,105 stated that 
the good faith exception is applicable "when the officer conducting the 
search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a 
detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be 
invalid."106 Justice Stevens has stated that "the Court has not yet held 
that the rule of United States v. Leon ... has any application to warrant-
less searches."107 As such, the good faith exception currently is applica-
ble only to searches incident to a warrant. 
101. Mr. Mertens and Professor Wasserstrom argue that had the good faith exception 
existed "the fourth amendment issues resolved in such cases as Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); and Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); might never have been decided." Mertens & Was-
serstrom, supra note 83, at 371. 
102. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422. 
103. Id. at 3423. 
104. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Peltier, 
422 U.S. 531 (1975). 
105. 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3426 (1984). 
106. Id. at 3428 (emphasis added). 
107. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3496 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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2. The standard is one of objective reasonableness 
In determining whether the good faith exception has been met, the 
subjective good faith of the officer is not controlling. As the Court stated 
in Leon, "the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause deter-
mination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must 
be objectively reasonable."108 
The Leon test is analogous to the second prong of the expectation of 
privacy test set forth by the Court in Katz v. United States. 109 The Katz 
Court stated that to determine whether a search or seizure involved an 
area protected by the fourth amendment, a court must apply the two-
part expectation of privacy test: first, that a person exhibit an actual, 
subjective, expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be 
one society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Since the Katz de-
cision, the Court has been forced to interpret what society, through the 
voice of the Court, is prepared to recognize as reasonable. I 10 It is likely 
that the Court will face a series of Leon progeny cases interpreting what 
society, through the nine-member Supreme Court, is prepared to recog-
nize as "reasonable" police reliance on a search warrant. 
3. What is Unreasonableness? 
The Leon Court presented three specific situations where no objec-
tively reasonable grounds exist for believing a warrant is proper: (1) 
where the judge or magistrate is mislead by information in an affidavit 
that the affiant knew or should have known, absent a reckless disregard 
of the truth, was false; (2) where a magistrate abandons his neutral and 
detached role; and (3) where a warrant is so lacking in the indicia of 
probable cause or so facially invalid that no officer reasonably could rely 
upon it.111 
a. Misrepresentations to the issuing Magistrate: when is it enough to 
suppress the evidence? 
Under Leon, if the judge or magistrate is mislead by an affidavit 
containing information that the affiant knew or would have known, ab-
sent a reckless disregard for the truth, was false, suppression of the evi-
dence is still an appropriate remedy. To defeat a good faith claim by the 
police, the defendant must challenge the truthfulness of the factual state-
ments made in the affidavit supporting the warrant. I 12 In Franks v. Dela-
ware,1I3 the Supreme Court determined when a criminal defendant has 
108. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421. 
109. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
110. [d. at 360-61; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-41 (1979). 
111. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421-22. There are actually four examples, but the author is 
treating the last two - bare bones affidavit and facially deficient warrant - as one. 
112. [d. at 3421. 
113.438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
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the right to make that challenge. I 14 
The Franks Court held that a movant applying for suppression of 
evidence must meet two tests before a hearing on the issue of suppression 
is required. The defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing 
that: I 15 (1) the magistrate was mislead by a false statement that was 
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, in-
cluded by the affiant in the affidavit; and (2) absent the false statement, 
the affidavit does not contain sufficient facts to support a probable cause 
determination. 116 At the hearing, if the defendant establishes proof of 
the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, and if the remaining 
facts are insufficient to support a probable cause determination, the war-
rant is voided and the fruits thereof excluded. 117 
The police action condemned in Franks - an officer's deliberate 
perjury or reckless disregard for the truth - is a blatant example of bad 
faith and is precisely the conduct sought to be deterred by the exclusion-
ary rule. 118 Unfortunately, the Franks rule does not ensure adequately 
that this bad faith will result in the exclusion of evidence at trial. Under 
the second prong of the Franks test, it is assumed that if the issuing mag-
istrate had known that the officer was lying about one fact, the magis-
trate still would assign the same weight to the other facts in the affidavit, 
and the magistrate would believe the other facts, and determine that 
probable cause existed. A more likely conclusion is that if the issuing 
magistrate had known of the misrepresentation in the affidavit, he would 
have been less likely to believe other facts in the affidavit and he would 
have denied the warrant application.I 19 
114. [d. at 155. The Supreme Court of Delaware held, as a matter of first impression, 
that under no circumstances may a defendant challenge the veracity of a sworn 
statement. 373 A.2d 578, 579-80 (Del. 1977). 
115. The requirement of a substantial preliminary showing is to prevent the misuse of a 
veracity hearing for the purposes of discovery or obstruction. 438 U.S. at 167. 
116. [d. at 155-56. 
117. [d. at 156. 
118. The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct that has deprived the 
defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such 
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those officers, or in their counterparts, a greater 
degree of care toward the rights of the accused. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3419 (quoting 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975». 
119. This is the corollary of the logic behind the self-verifying detail aspect of the prob-
able cause test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). If an informant is correct 
about some facts, he is probably correct about others. [d. at 244 (quoting Spinelli, 
393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring». 
The Franks requirement that the affidavit be lacking probable cause without 
the illegally obtained facts has been extended to other types of illegal activity. In 
United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), several facts in the affidavit had been 
obtained by the unconstitutional use of a beeper. The Karo Court cited Franks for 
the proposition that a warrant is not voided so long as there remains sufficient un-
tainted facts in the affidavit to support probable cause. That test is more sensible in 
Karo than in Franks. In Karo, the illegally obtained facts did not taint the affidavit 
itself because there were sufficient independently obtained facts to support probable 
cause. In Franks, the misrepresentations by the affiant officer rendered the whole 
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b. When does the magistrate abandon his role as a neutral decision 
maker? 
513 
Leon provides that where a magistrate abandons his neutral and de-
tached function, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does 
not apply. Unfortunately, there is no clear test to determine when a 
magistrate has abandoned his neutral and detached role. 
In Leon, the Supreme Court cited Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York and 
held that a police officer cannot reasonably rely on a warrant resulting 
from action by a magistrate who has acted inconsistently with his role as 
an impartial judge. 120 In Lo-Ji Sales, the investigating officers requested 
a warrant to seize films and books from an "adult bookstore." The officer 
had viewed two reels of film purchased from the store, taken them to the 
town justice, and requested a warqmt to seize copies of the two films and 
other "similar" films in the store. The warrant application also included 
a request that the town justice accompany the investigator to determine 
which of the other films were obscene. 121 Accordingly, the magistrate 
included in the warrant the phrase: "The following items that the court 
independently [on examination] has determined to be possessed in viola-
tion of [the New York State obscenity law.],,122 The magistrate, along 
with three state police officers, the investigator, three local police officers, 
and three members of the local prosecutor's office, entered the store to 
determine which films and books should be seized. The magistrate 
viewed twenty-three films and other materials and concluded that there 
was probable cause to believe that the material was obscene. 123 
According to the Supreme Court, the magistrate in Lo-Ji Sales "al-
lowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search 
party."124 Because the town justice undertook to "telescope the process 
of the application for a warrant, the issuance of the warrant and its exe-
cution,"125 the Court found that the town justice had abandoned his 
"neutral and detached role" and thus held that the evidence should be 
excluded. 126 
The Leon Court decided that no reasonable police officer could be-
lieve that a magistrate's action such as the type in Lo-Ji Sales constituted 
an independent determination of probable cause and, therefore, no police 
officer could be said to rely on such a warrant in good faith.127 The 
Court, however, has not provided a test to determine when, short of ac-
affidavit suspect because the remaining information also came from the untruthful 
affiant. 
120. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422 (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979». 
121. La-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 321. 
122. [d. at 321-22. 
123. [d. at 322-23. 
124. [d. at 327. 
125. [d. at 328. 
126. [d. at 329. 
127. 104 S. Ct. at 3422. 
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tual involvement in the physical investigation, a magistrate abandons his 
neutral role. 
The Ninth Circuit was faced recently with this issue in United States 
v. Hendricks.128 On May 10, 1983, a customs agent in Los Angeles in-
spected a cardboard box arriving from Brazil and addressed to Hen-
dricks. The address on the box was Hendricks's home address, and was 
there for identification purposes only; the box was shipped in a manner 
that required him to pick it up personally.!29 Inside the box was a suit-
case in which the inspector found five to seven pounds of cocaine. The 
customs agent sent the box on to Tucson, Arizona where it was turned 
over to Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials. 130 While the DEA 
agents were holding the box, they gathered other information that was 
included in an affidavit for a search warrant for Hendricks's residence. 
That information tended to show that Hendricks operated a company 
called Brazilian Imports, and that a small amount of cocaine previously 
had been sent to the company by mail. \31 There were no facts even re-
motely suggesting any evidence of a crime at Hendricks's residence.!32 
Based on this information and knowing that the box was at the air-
port in the possession of the DEA agents, the magistrate issued a warrant 
for a search of Hendricks's residence. The warrant stated: "on the 
premises known as 2835 North Sidney ... there is now being concealed 
... a ... cardboard box containing cocaine."!33 The warrant further 
stated that "this search warrant is to be executed only upon the condition 
that the above described box is brought to the aforesaid premises."!34 
The warrant was executed and cocaine was found. Hendricks entered a 
conditional guilty plea, appealing only the denial of his suppression 
motion.!35 
The Hendricks court stated that the effort by the magistrate to limit 
his official conduct, not expand it, kept the magistrate within his judicial 
role.!36 Consequently, the good faith exception was applicable, and the 
cocaine seized at Hendricks's residence was not required to be excluded 
at trial. Lo-Ji Sales thus properly is limited to its facts by Hendricks. 
c. Appellate review of a "bare bones" affidavit 
The Leon Court stated that where a warrant is lacking facially in the 
indicia of probable cause and reliance on it is unreasonable, there is an 
128. 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984). 
129. Id. at 653. 
130.Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 656. 
133. Id. at 654 (emphasis supplied by the court). 
134. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court). 
135. Id. The court stressed the good faith of the officers in executing the search, but did 
not list expressly what was seized, or even if the box itself was seized. We must infer 
that cocaine was seized from Hendricks's conditional plea of guilty. 
136. Id. at 656. 
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absence of good faith. Thus, if an affidavit contains so few facts that it is 
a "mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others," 137 a police officer 
cannot have manifested objective good faith in either applying for or exe-
cuting the warrant.138 The current test for appellate review of a magis-
trate's probable cause determination, as set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Illinois v. Gates,139 has so relaxed the standard of appellate review of 
warrants that a discussion of that test is necessary to understand the 
scope of the Leon "bare bones" test. 
In Gates, the Supreme Court revised the standard for determining 
when a warrant is supported by probable cause. The Court stated that 
an issuing magistrate must apply a two-part test: first, the magistrate 
must decide whether the affidavit contains sufficient facts on which to 
make a probable cause decision; and second, the magistrate must review 
the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if probable cause ex-
ists. l40 The Court found that the job of a reviewing court, however, is 
limited to "ensur[ing] that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for con-
clud[ing]' that probable cause existed."141 If the appellate court decides 
that there are sufficient facts to support a probable cause determination, 
the appellate court's job is over; the reviewing court should not substitute 
its interpretation of the evidence for that of the magistrate. 142 
The Gates Court noted that the earlier Supreme Court cases of Na-
thanson v. United States 143 and Aguilar v. Texas 144 "illustrate the limits 
beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant."145 
The affidavits at issue in Nathanson and Aguilar failed to provide the 
137. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3417 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983». 
138. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421 n. 24. The rationale here is based on the assumption 
that police are trained to know that an affidavit must contain sufficient facts to 
support a probable cause determination. /d. at 3421. If a magistrate issues a war-
rant upon an affidavit that is so facially deficient of facts that any police officer 
would know that the affidavit could not possibly support an independent probable 
cause determination, then no police officer may rely reasonably upon that warrant 
and execute it in good faith. Id. at 3422. 
139. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
140. The Court's statement of the magistrate's task is as follows: "The task of the magis-
trate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 462 U.S. at 
238. The author's interpretation of the task as two faceted comes from an analysis 
of the two Gates requirements: (1) great deference should be given to the magis-
trate's decision, 462 U.S. at 213; and (2) the totality of the circumstances test. 462 
U.S. at 230, 238. 
141. 462 U.S. at 238 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960». 
142. The Court stated: "Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny of 
the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of a de novo review. A magis-
trate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing 
courts.''' /d. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969». 
143. 260 U.S. 41 (1933). 
144. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
145. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. 
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magistrate with a substantial basis for determining probable cause. The 
Nathanson warrant contained the following language: 
Whereas said Francis B. Laughin has stated under his oath that 
he has cause to suspect and does believe that . . . liquors of 
foreign origin ... upon which the duties have not been paid, or 
which has otherwise been brought into the United States con-
trary to law, ... is [sic] now deposited and contained within the 
premises .... 146 
The Aguilar affidavit contained "[a]n officer's statement that [a]ffiants 
have reviewed reliable information from a credible person and do believe 
that heroin is stored in a home .... "147 The Gates Court noted that 
when the evidence goes beyond Nathanson and Aguilar, no prescribed set 
of rules is feasible. 148 This statement, together with the requirement that 
a magistrate's determination be given great deference,149 implies that an 
appellate reversal under Gates will only occur where there is a "bare 
bones" affidavit. 
The Gates decision relates directly to the "bare bones" example dis-
cussed in Leon. In Leon, the Court stated that a facially invalid warrant 
exists where no reasonable assertion of objective good faith can be made. 
If the Gates probable cause test and standard of review effectively has 
narrowed the probable cause standard of review to a finding of "no facts 
upon which a magistrate can base a decision," then it is essentially the 
same test that Justice White, in Leon, suggests for finding a lack of good 
faith. As such, the standard of review under Leon should be the same as 
the standard set forth in Gates. 
Justice White stated in Leon that "[e]ven if the warrant application 
is supported by more than a 'bare bones' affidavit a reviewing court prop-
erly may conclude that, notwithstanding the deference that magistrates 
deserve, the warrant was invalid because the magistrate's probable cause 
determination reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the cir-
cumstances, or because the form of the warrant was improper in some 
respect."150 That a reviewing court may find no probable cause despite 
more than "barebones," is at best a rationalization of, and at worst a 
misinterpretation of, the standard set forth in Gates. In contrast, a war-
rant invalidated for a technical problem with the form of the warrant, is 
exactly when the good faith exception should be applied. 151 
The ability of an appellate court to overturn a trial court's factually 
supportable probable cause determination is questionable particularly in 
light of the more recent Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v. 
146. Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 44. 
147. Gates, 462 U.S. at 213 (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 108). 
148. Jd. at 239. 
149. Jd. at 236; see infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text. 
150. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3417. 
151. See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text. 
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Upton.1S2 In Upton, the Court interpreted and applied the Gates stan-
dard of review in a search and seizure case. The Upton Court found that 
the Massachusetts court erred in failing to give deference to the magis-
trate's decision because the Massachusetts court did not limit its decision 
to "whether the evidence viewed as a whole provided a 'substantial basis' 
for the magistrate's finding of probable cause."153 Instead, the Massa-
chusetts court engaged in a de novo probable cause determination. 154 
The Supreme Court stated that the job of interpreting and weighing each 
fact and drawing inferences from those facts is the magistrate's alone, 
and it is enough that the inferences drawn be reasonable and conform 
with the other pieces of evidence making up the total showing of prob-
able cause. 155 The Court added that "[i]n concluding that there was 
probable cause for the issuance of this warrant, the magistrate can hardly 
be accused of approving a mere 'hunch' or bare recital of legal conclu-
sions."156 This suggests that in order for a probable cause determination 
to be reversed properly under Gates/Upton, the magistrate's probable 
cause determination must be based on hunches or bare recitals of legal 
conclusions. 157 Thus, a valid finding of no probable cause should not 
coincide with a finding of objective good faith. 
The Ninth Circuit's Hendricks 158 decision applies the correct stan-
dard of appellate review for probable cause, but reaches the wrong con-
clusion regarding the good faith exception. The Hendricks court 
properly recognized that its probable cause review was limited to deter-
mining whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 
that the box was at Hendricks's house at the time the warrant was is-
sued. 159 Under the Gates/Upton test, although the facts in the affidavit 
could support a determination that Hendricks was involved in crime, 
there was not a single fact that could support a probable cause determi-
nation that the box was at his house or on its way to his house. l60 In 
fact, the magistrate knew the box was not at the house, but rather in the 
152. 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984) (per curiam). 
153. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
in Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562,458 N.E.2d 717 (1983), had misinter-
preted the Gates holding in both respects: (1) the state court did not believe that 
Gates abandoned the Aguilar/Spinelli test; and (2) the state court did not give defer-
ence to the magistrate's decision. [d. at 2088. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. at 2088-89. 
156. [d. (emphasis added). 
157. See Gates, 462 U.S. 213 at 239. 
158. 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1362 (1985); see supra notes 
128-36 and accompanying text. 
159. 743 F.2d at 654-56. 
160. /d. at 654. The court distinguished this case from "controlled delivery" cases, 
where the government knows that the object is on a sure course to the house, for 
example by mail. See United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 869 (I978); United 
States ex rei. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969). 
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hands of the DEA agents. 161 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found that 
probable cause did not exist because there was no basis for a probable 
cause determination. 162 The Ninth Circuit also stated that although the 
warrant was invalid, the evidence was not excludable because of the good 
faith exception. 
The appellant in Hendricks argued that the magistrate had aban-
doned his judicial role, but did not argue that either of the other two 
Leon limitations on the good faith exception applied. 163 Therefore, the 
court decided only that the magistrate had not abandoned his neutral 
and detached role and that there was good faith reliance by the officer on 
the warrant. 
Although the point was not argued by the parties, the court should 
have concluded that the Hendricks case was a prime example of "a war-
rant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' "164 The 
court suggested that the sentence in the warrant, "this search warrant is 
to be executed only upon the condition that the above described box is 
brought to the aforesaid premises," established good faith on the part of 
the officers. 165 If anything, however, there was not only objective bad 
faith but also SUbjective bad faith; the officers knew at the time they ap-
plied for the warrant that the box was not at, or on its way to, Hen-
dricks's house. 
The Hendricks decision seems to be an example of the kind of mis-
application of the good faith exception that Justice Blackmun, in his con-
curring opinion in Leon, feared would occur. Although Justice 
Blackmun agreed that the good faith exception was unavoidable because 
the exclusionary rule was not mandated constitutionally, he expressed a 
concern that police compliance with the fourth amendment might be 
"materially changed" as a result. 166 In Hendricks, it appears that his 
fears have become a reality. Conversely, the second part of Justice 
White's statement in Leon, that a warrant may be invalidated because of 
a technical problem with the form of the warrant, 167 is the exact situation 
161. 743 F.2d at 654. 
162. Id. at 655-56. 
163. Id. at 656. 
164. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part». 
165. Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654, 656. 
166. Justice Blackmun stated: 
By their very nature, the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot 
be cast in stone. To the contrary, they now will be tested in the real world 
of state and federal law enforcement, this Court will attend to the results. 
If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change 
in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to recon-
sider what we have undertaken here. 
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3424 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
167. See supra text accompanying note 151. 
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where the good faith exception should apply. 
This was precisely the situation involved in Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard. '68 There, a police officer had gathered evidence in the investigation 
of a homicide and had drafted an affidavit to support an application for 
an arrest warrant and a search warrant. 169 The affidavit stated that the 
police wished to search for certain described items, including clothing of 
the victim and a possible weaponYo Because it was Sunday, the officer 
had a difficult time finding a warrant application form. The detective 
used a form previously used in drug cases. 171 After making some 
changes, the officer submitted the form to the judge, telling the judge that 
it might need to be changed. The judge then concluded that the affidavit 
established probable cause and assured the officer that he would make 
whatever changes to the form of the affidavit required to make it 
proper. 172 The judge made some changes, but not enough to withstand a 
strict technical attack. 173 The ensuing search was limited to those items 
listed in the affidavit and some evidence was recovered. 174 At the pretrial 
suppression hearing the trial judge ruled the evidence admissible, because 
of the officer's good faith. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
reversed. 175 The Supreme Court, however, upheld the trial judge's rul-
ing of admissibility. 176 
Sheppard is the precise example of objective good faith on the part 
of the police. The officer had gathered all the information necessary to 
establish probable cause. He was investigating a brutal murder; was of 
the essence. The affidavit contained a description of what was to be 
seized, but because the judge failed to incorporate the affidavit by refer-
ence on the form, the warrant was technically invalid. 177 
Sheppard is distinguishable from the facts of Hendricks in that the 
police officer in Sheppard had sufficient evidence to establish probable 
cause and satisfy the "particularity of items to be seized" requirement for 
the issuance of a warrant. In Sheppard, suppression of the evidence 
could not possibly serve any deterrent purpose. The officer had satisfied 
all of the requirements of the fourth amendment and been assured that 
the form was correct. The officer even expressed his concern that the 
form of the warrant be corrected if necessary. In Hendricks, the deter-
rent effect served would be to prevent police officers from applying for 
warrants unless there was evidence that the contraband was on the prem-
ises to be searched. 
168. 104 U.S. 3424 (1984). 
169. Id. at 3427. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. !d. 
173.Id. 
174. !d. at 3428. 
175. !d.; Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982). 
176. Sheppard, 104 U.S. at 3430. 
177. Id. at 3429 n.7. 
520 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
In sum, when a warrant is so lacking in the indicia of probable cause 
that it fails the Gates test, it also should fail the Leon good faith test. 
Where, however, an officer has acquired all relevant evidence to support 
the probable cause and particularity requirements of the fourth amend-
ment but the warrant is technically invalid in form, the good faith excep-
tion should be applied. 
IV. A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO WARRANTLESS 
SEARCHES 
The fourth amendment provides that no searches may be conducted 
without a warrant. On many occasions, however, the Court has created 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 178 Although the Leon Court cre-
ated a good faith exception only for searches pursuant to a warrant, the 
Court did not preclude the possibility of extending the exception to war-
rantless searches. 
A. The Fifth Circuit's Adoption of a Good Faith Exception to 
Warrantless Searches 
In United States v. Williams, 179 the Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted a 
good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures. 180 In Wil-
liams, the appellant was arrested in Atlanta for violation of an order 
prohibiting travel from Ohio. In a search incident to her arrest, a packet 
of heroin was found in her coat. Based upon that information, the DEA 
officer requested and received a warrant to search her bags. This search 
revealed a larger quantity of heroin. 181 Williams claimed that all the evi-
dence was excludable because her arrest was illegal and the resulting 
search and information upon which the search warrant was based were, 
therefore, tainted. 182 The court found that the arrest was lega}183 and 
178. The Supreme Court has recognized six exceptions to the warrant requirement: (I) 
searches incident to a lawful arrest; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1983); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969); (2) "automobile" searches; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (3) "hot pursuit" and other exigent cir-
cumstances; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); cf Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U.S. 385 (1978); (4) consent searches; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973); (5) "stop and frisk" searches; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968); Bumper v. 
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); and (6) "plain view" searches; Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). For 
a complete discussion of exceptions to the warrant requirement, see 2 W. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 5.1-8.6 (1978 & Supp. 1985); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE 9.1-9.6 (1978 & Supp. 1985). 
179.622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). 
180. Id. at 840-48. This was the holding of Part II of the Williams opinion. In Part I of 
the opinion, the court found that the arrest had in fact been legal. Id. at 839. This 
raises a question as to whether Part II is an alternative ground for the decision or 
dictum. See Williams, 622 F.2d at 848-49 (Rubin, J., concurring). 
181. 622 F.2d at 834. 
182. Id. at 835. 
183. Id. at 833-39. 
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that the good faith exception should be adopted for warrantless searches 
and seizures. ls4 The Williams court set out two facets to the good faith 
exception: "technical violation" and "good faith mistake."lss The tech-
nical violation applies when an officer relies upon: (1) a statute that is 
declared unconstitutional; (2) a warrant that is later declared invalid; or 
(3) a court precedent that is later overruled. ls6 The good faith mistake 
applies when an officer makes a judgmental error concerning the exist-
ence of probable cause. IS7 The technical violation facet of the good faith 
184. Id. at 840-47. 
185. Id. at 841. 
186. Id. This is the same rationale behind the Supreme Court holdings in Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (good faith reliance on presumptively constitutional 
statute), United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (good faith reliance on search 
warrant), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (good faith reliance on 
prior court decisions). 
187. Williams, 622 F.2d at 840. The only fourth amendment Supreme Court cases cited 
by the Williams court in support of its "good faith mistake" rule were United States 
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
Neither the holdings nor rationales of either of these cases support the rule. Both 
Janis and Tucker were decided on grounds other than the good or bad faith of the 
police officers; in both cases good faith was not determinate of the propriety of sup-
pression. 
In Janis, the Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil 
proceedings. The rationale behind that ruling is that law enforcement officers are 
concerned primarily with enforcing the criminal, not civil, law and thus the exclu-
sion in a civil case of evidence seized by police will have no deterrent effect. The 
Williams court seized upon the mention of "good faith" by the Janis court to sug-
gest that the good faith of the officers was the basis for the Janis opinion. What the 
Williams court ignored, however, is that under Janis the exclusionary rule is inap-
plicable to civil proceedings irrespective of the good or bad faith of the officers. The 
Janis Court concluded that exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence un-
lawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a 
sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police officer to outweigh 
the societal costs imposed by exclusion. Janis, 428 U.S. at 454. 
In Tucker, the Supreme Court held it improper to suppress the testimony of a 
witness whose identity was discovered by a violation of the defendant's rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court reasoned that the deterrent 
effect of the exclusionary rule was fulfilled by suppressing the accused's own words. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448. The Tucker case was very narrow in the respect that the 
case involved a change of law subsequent to the police conduct~ What the officer did 
was legal under the old law, but illegal under the change. It is interesting that the 
Williams court cited the rather narrow Tucker case but ignored the more broad 
holding of United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1977), where the Supreme 
Court held that whenever a witness's identity is discovered by a constitutional viola-
tion, that witness's testimony will not be excluded absent a direct link between the 
illegality and the resulting testimony, 435 U.S. at 278-80. The Court noted that, in 
determining whether the testimony of a live witness found by unconstitutional 
methods should be suppressed, factors to be considered are the length of the "road" 
between the violation and the witness's testimony (attenuation) and the degree of 
free will exercised by the witness. !d. at 276-79. Good faith is not listed as a factor. 
Moreover, in quoting the Janis and Tucker dictum out of context, the Williams 
court ignored the "neutral and detached" magistrate requirement of the fourth 
amendment. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 497 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); see 
infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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exception is supported by both the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule and Supreme Court precedent; the good faith mistake facet is sup-
ported by neither. 
In support of the "technical violation" facet of the good faith excep-
tion, the court relied in part upon Michigan v. DeFillippo,188 which held 
that evidence seized pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutional 
should not be suppressed. 189 The logic behind that holding, and the tech-
nical violation aspect of the good faith exception as well, is that a police 
officer has done all that is required of him - he has followed the law as it 
existed at the time of his actions.190 There is no possible deterrent effect 
in suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a presumptively valid stat-
ute. 191 This is the same reasoning relied upon by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Leon. 192 
In situations like Defillippo and Leon, the police officer has no 
choice but to follow the path laid for him by another governmental body 
or officer. Those situations are very different from the situation in which 
the officer must make the choice of which path to follow. What the Wil-
liams court failed to consider in adopting the "good faith mistake" facet 
of the good faith exception is that the fourth amendment not only guards 
against searches without probable cause, but also against searches where 
the probable cause determination is made by someone other than a neu-
tral and detached magistrate. 193 As Justice Jackson stated in Johnson v. 
United States: 194 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not 
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforce-
ment the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men 
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that 
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 195 
188. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). 
189. [d. 
190. [d. at 36-38. 
191. Williams, 622 F.2d at 842; DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38. 
192. 104 S. Ct: 3405 (1984). The Fifth Circuit has relied upon the broad language in 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), which stated "evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer 
had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." Williams, 622 F.2d at 843. That 
statement taken out of context would seem to support all actions where the police 
have a good faith belief that their conduct is not violative of the fourth amendment. 
The Peltier case, however, dealt with the situation where a law enforcement officer 
relied upon an administrative process that consistently had been approved. The 
Peltier decision was actually a refusal of the Court to apply retroactively the deci-
sion that overruled the rule relied upon by the officer. 
193. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 497 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
194. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
195. [d. at 13-14. 
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C. The Constitutionality of a Good Faith Exception to Warrantless 
Searches and Seizures 
523 
A good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures could be 
recognized in two situations: (1) where the officer reasonably believes 
that there is probable cause and fails to obtain a warrant; and (2) where 
the officer reasonably believes that the search falls into one of the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. 
To allow an officer in the field to make a probable cause decision 
without obtaining a warrant, absent one of the recognized exceptions to 
the warrant requirement, would contradict directly the "neutral and de-
tached magistrate" requirement of Johnson. 196 Because the purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional police conduct, 197 it fol-
lows that an officer's independent probable cause determination is pre-
cisely the conduct to be deterred. The exclusionary rule deters not only 
wrong decisions in the execution of a warrant, but also the mere making 
of a decision where the officer should apply for a warrant. 198 Because 
exclusion of evidence in such a case furthers the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, an extension of the good faith exception to such situa-
tions would be improper. 
The extension of the good faith exception to an officer's reasonable 
belief that one of the warrantless exceptions exists would hinder the de-
terrent effect of the exclusionary rule and be unnecessary. If the exten-
sion is made, the officer who is not sure whether the circumstances 
support a warrantless exception, would, in essence, be rewarded for con-
ducting a search in good faith. Suppression of evidence, however, would 
deter illegal police action by discouraging police from making judgments 
regarding warrantless exceptions. 
On several occasions the Supreme Court has opted for a "bright-
line" rule approach to warrantless searches instead of proceeding on a 
factual case-by-case determination. When one of the prescribed situa-
tions allowing a warrantless search exists, the search should be upheld 
without addressing whether each of the original reasons behind the par-
ticular warrantless exception exists. 199 This creates a system of "bright-
line" rules that police may follow, instead of making in-the-field judg-
ments as to the exigencies of each situation. In support of this rule-ori-
ented approach, the Court has upheld searches incident to lawful arrests 
where the danger to the policeman was minima1. 2°O Additionally, the 
Court has upheld automobile searches even where the owner has been 
196. Id. 
197. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 
(1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
198. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14. 
199. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.01 at 33 (1980). 
200. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 281 (1973) (defendant stopped for traffic 
violation). 
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separated from his automobile.201 These holdings not only make the job 
of the policeman easier, they also follow the premise that, absent some 
predetermined authority, the decision to stop and search should be made 
by a neutral and detached magistrate. 
Additionally, it is unnecessary to extend the good faith exception to 
warrantless searches because each of the present exceptions to the war-
rant requirement already contain a reasonableness requirement. For in-
stance, the search incident to arrest is limited by the reasonableness of the 
scope and intensity of the search.202 Similarly, the hot pursuit or exi-
gency exception requires that the search not continue beyond a reason-
able period of time.203 Because of the inherent objective reasonableness 
justifying each of the warrantless exceptions, and the deterrent effect of 
suppressing evidence obtained where an officer has acted upon probable 
cause but without a warrant, the good faith exception should not be ex-
tended to warrantless searches. 
V. MARYLAND'S TREATMENT OF THE GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION 
There has been an emerging trend among state appellate courts to 
afford citizens greater protection under their state constitutions than the 
Supreme Court has afforded under the federal constitution.204 The 
Supreme Court of Oregon, has been a leader in this trend. In State v. 
Davis,205 the Supreme Court of Oregon, relying on prior Oregon prece-
dent, rejected the United States Supreme Court's deterrent analysis re-
garding the exclusionary rule.206 To counteract this trend among the 
state courts, the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long207 
201. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); see United States v. Roth, 4S6 U.S. 798 
(1983). 
202. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. S6 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 
U.S. 145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
203. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
Also, the automobile exception, although allowing searches after the exigency 
apparently has dissipated, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), still requires 
that there be some exigency at the point of confrontation. See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 393 U.S. at 42, 52. The stop and frisk exception requires articulable 
suspicion, an objective test that will not be satisfied by mere "hunches." Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The plain view 
doctrine requires not only a reasonable initial intrusion, but also a reasonable inad-
vertence in discovering the evidence. Coolidge, 339 U.S. at 469-71. But see Texas v. 
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). Consent searches require that the consent be ob-
tained reasonably and voluntarily. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973). 
204. In Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981), the Oregon court granted 
prison inmates a higher level of privacy under the state constitution than would 
have been applicable under the federal constitution. Id. at 126-33. The court rea-
soned that, "the proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitu-
tional law before reaching a federal constitutional claim." Id. at 126. 
205. 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802 (1983). 
206. Id. at 235, 666 P.2d at 807. 
207. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
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held that a state court decision is based presumptively on federal grounds 
and; therefore, reviewable unless it is shown explicitly in the state court 
opinion that the decision is based only on the state constitution or sup-
porting state precedent.20s 
Maryland courts have consistently followed the Supreme Court's in-
terpretations of the fourth amendment. In Potts v. State,209 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland followed the Supreme Court's analysis in Illinois v. 
Gates 2 \0 and refused to offer the defendant more protection under article 
26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2 I I The Potts court stated that 
article 26 and the fourth amendment developed from the same historical 
background and that article 26 is in pari materia with its federal counter-
part. Based on this reasoning, the court adopted the totality of circum-
stances standard of review as set forth in Gates.212 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland already has adopted the 
good faith exception. In Randall Book Corp. v. State,213 that court inter-
preted Leon as requiring that a warrant be suppressed "only if the officers 
were dishonest or reckless or could not have harbored an objectively rea-
sonable belief in the existence of probable cause."214 The court also 
noted that there was no assertion that the judge who issued the warrant 
had abandoned his proper role. 215 Thus, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland listed the same three examples of bad faith stated in Leon: the 
officer recklessly misleading the magistrate,216 the magistrate abandoning 
his neutral and detached role,217 and the "bare bones" affidavit.2ls 
In Randall Book Corp., the court addressed the problem in the 
proper procedural manner. The court decided that there had been a 
fourth amendment violation;219 the court then concluded that the good 
faith exception prohibited exclusion of the evidence.220 This is the cor-
rect procedure because it allows appellate courts to provide guidance to 
the magistrates regarding the adequacy of issued warrants. If the case 
were decided on good faith alone, judges would be unable to ascertain 
any new constitutional violations.221 
208. Id. at 3474-78. 
209. 300 Md. 567,479 A.2d 1335 (1984). 
210. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
211. Potts, 300 Md. at 576-77, 479 A.2d at 1340. 
212. Id. 
213. 64 Md. App. 589, 497 A.2d 1174 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 175, 452 A.2d 187 
(1986). 
214. Id. at 602, 497 A.2d at 1180. 
215. Id. 
216. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 137-77 and accompanying text. 
219. 64 Md. App. at 600-01, 497 A.2d at 1179. 
220. Id. at 602, 497 A.2d at 1180. 
221. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Leon,222 the Supreme Court adopted the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The test set forth to determine 
good faith is an objective one. 
Adopting a good faith exception for technically invalid warrants is 
consistent with the concept of deterring police misconduct. Extension of 
a good faith exception to warrantless searches that violate the fourth 
amendment, however, would be inconsistent with the deterrence ration-
ale of the exclusionary rule. That extension would encourage police of-
ficers to make probable cause determinations themselves, one of the evils 
prohibited by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment. The good faith exception does not, and should not, apply to war-
rantless searches. Rather, it should be restricted to technical violations in 
the form of the search warrant such as the violation in Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard. 223 
The future of the good faith exception appears to be in the hands of 
the police officers themselves. As Justice Blackman expressed it in his 
concurrence in Leon: 
If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our 
expectations, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
results in a material change in police compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have 
undertaken here . . . . 
If a single principle may be drawn from this Court's exclu-
sionary rule decisions ... it is that the scope of the exclusionary 
rule is subject to change in light of changing judicial under-
standing about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the 
courtroom. It is incumbent on the Nation's law enforcement 
officers, who must continue to observe the Fourth Amendment 
in the wake of today's decisions, to recognize the double-edged 
nature of that principle.224 
Thomas Page Lloyd 
222. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
223. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3427 (1984); see supra notes 167-77 and ac-
companying text. 
224. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3424 (1984) (Blackman, J., concurring). 
